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The Mere Extinguishment of [Human] Life1 
 
“We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding” — Chief Justice Marshall, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 
 
Capital punishment has been a standard-practice tool of the  American criminal justice 
since  colonizers arrived from Europe. Condemned men and women were shot, electrocuted, 
hanged, crushed, gassed, lethally-injected, and burned at the stake in the name of good order and 
retribution. As every other western democracy began to abolish the death penalty over the course 
of the twentieth century, the United States held fast to the age-old practice, repeatedly reforming 
legislation and rules of fair punishment set down by the Supreme Court to limit and target the 
penalty to the worst criminals, even pausing the practice nationally for four years amid concerns 
that death was too arbitrarily imposed.2 Yet today, more than forty-three years since the Court 
allowed executions to resume in 1976, capital punishment in the United States remains as 
arbitrary and without justificatory effect as ever. Supporters of capital punishment maintain that 
it has legitimate deterrent and retributive effects,3 that it is more reliable and targeted than ever 
before,4 and that the US Constitution explicitly permits its use.5 They are wrong on all counts, 
and furthermore, the argument has been improperly framed.  
 The position this paper advances is squarely against capital punishment in the United 
States, yet the primary aim of this work is to reframe the question under a new interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment. Through research which qualifies the orthodox historical ‘record,’ close 
analysis of Supreme Court decisions on death, and extensive use of statistical analysis, it will 
propose a comprehensive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that combines two separate 
threads of death penalty abolitionism and Court precedent to furnish a more effective argument. 
The first section will briefly review  the history of Anglo-American legal thinking on capital 
punishment, emphasizing with primary sources the unease with which the punishment was 
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treated during the drafting and ratification period. It will then outline the Supreme Court’s role in 
defining the Eighth Amendment from its earliest cases to the death penalty moratorium in 
Furman v. Georgia (1972). The second section of this article will evaluate the successes and 
failures of constitutional regulation of capital punishment using the most recently available 
statistics collected from hundreds of studies. It is necessary to provide such factual grounds as 
these to demonstrate the urgency of and application for my interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment. Having established this necessary predicate, this article will conclude by 
identifying and combining an “aspirational” and “restrictive” interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” to argue that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional.6  
Part I: The Road to Regulation 
Execution in the Colonies 
The first English colonies in America were little different than their motherland in terms 
of criminal justice. Treason, murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, 
counterfeiting, and theft were all capital crimes in the American Colonies, just like England.7 
The Northern colonies were more lenient than England in imposing death for property crimes, 
and even when blasphemy, idolatry, sodomy, and buggery became capital crimes, these statutes 
were rarely enforced. When England began developing a larger list of capital crimes in the early 
1700s, named by critics its “bloody code,” the American South was quick to follow suit with 
statutes only applicable to enslaved Blacks. Slaves were subject to execution for burning or 
destroying commodities, convincing others to run away, striking and bruising a white, preparing 
or administering medicine, or conspiring to do any of the above.8 The administration of the death 
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penalty in America has been a racialized affair ever since the first Blacks were imported as 
slaves in 1619.  
 A standard capital procedure in the American Colonies was highly ceremonial. Trials 
were quick and uneventful. Witnesses usually testified only for the government, and defendants 
rarely had representation.9 Once a death warrant was issued, however, a carefully choreographed, 
three-part show would begin. The day would commence with a procession from the jail house to 
the gallows. Accompanied by ministers, the local sheriff, deputies and the occasional military 
escort, prisoners would walk or ride a pre-determined route lined with spectators to the gallows. 
Once arrived, the prisoner would climb the gallows and deliver a pre-written speech to the 
audience, often in rhymed verse.10 These speeches contained passionate, if occasionally 
inarticulate, appeals for clemency, reaffirmations of the prisoner’s innocence, or warnings to the 
crowd against a life of sin.  Copies, often edited to confer the maximum effect, were sold as 
mementos to onlookers or reprinted in newspapers.11 Finally, a minster would take the stage; he 
would pray for the repentance of the condemned and earnestly remind the crowd that a life of sin 
could only lead to an execution like the one before them. Ministers frequently used the captive 
audience, and the captive himself, to emphasize boilerplate pulpit warnings against the sin of 
drunkenness, breaking the sabbath, and even reading “idle and romantic books.”12 They were 
paid well for their work. With a hood pulled over his or her head, the prisoner would then be 
hanged.  
 Stuart Banner identifies two purposes for the ceremonial executions of the American 
Colonies: deterrence and reparation. The procession of armed guards surrounding a trembling 
prisoner and his repentant presentation before the community at large “provided a way to 
amplify the message of terror created by the hanging and to broadcast that message to the 
3
Cosentino: The Mere Extinguishment of [Human] Life
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
  
public.” It also served to reinforce order, as a ceremony by which the injured community could 
reconstitute itself by eliminating the aberrant among it. Through such ceremony, the pomp-and 
circumstance, “the sort of violence that establishes order was clearly marked off from the sort of 
violence that disrupts order.”13 Today, the principal rationale for the death penalty has not 
changed, with the exception that reparation has been re-termed “retribution” so as not to give the 
condemned too much power. 
The People vs. The Person 
It is difficult to say exactly why the American Colonies were less likely to administer the 
death penalty than their English cousins. Lower economic inequality, fervent religious 
conviction, or strong traditions of executive clemency are all possible explanations. However, 
the most defining difference between the English and American criminal justice systems was 
their locality. In other words, American officials were inefficient in enforcing the severity of 
their penal codes because they were ordinary citizens. Local sheriffs were not experienced 
professionals, nor were they eager to execute a member of their community—they often 
performed the task drunk.14 “Executions were often conducted by true representatives of the 
community, men without any specialized training, men who were known to the spectators as 
friends and neighbors.”15 This made the death penalty in America a truly popular exercise, and 
often created a tension between wide public support for the punishment and the inherently strong 
apprehension of actually carrying it out.16 
“A Revolution in Public Consciousness”17 
There is a misconception among supporters and abolitionists alike that capital 
punishment has always enjoyed near-universal support in the United States, and that opposition 
is purely a modern phenomenon.18 They often point to the Fifth Amendment’s seeming approval 
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of ‘deprivation of life’ as incontrovertible evidence, the merits of which will be discussed later in 
this article It is essential to note that this version of history is seriously flawed. In reality, capital 
punishment for property crimes was widely questioned in the 1760s and 1770s, and by the 1780s 
and 1790s, capital punishment “for any crime, even murder, was a bitterly contested issue.”19 It 
was the topic of debating societies, college commencement addresses, newspaper articles, and 
editorials across the American Colonies. James Madison, the drafter of the Bill of Rights, and 
DeWitt Clinton, soon-to-be governor of New York, opposed capital punishment in all cases. 
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson opposed its use for any crime but murder.20  
 The seeds of such opposition can be found in a 1764 essay, On Crimes and Punishments, 
in which Italian criminologist and philosopher Cesare Beccaria argued that a republic with 
popular sovereignty could not justly execute one of its citizens. He also opposed the death 
penalty on utilitarian grounds, writing that its imposition was too arbitrary and final to be an 
effective deterrent when compared to life imprisonment.21 The essay was translated into English 
and appeared in London and Dublin by 1767, soon attracting the attention of the foremost 
American political and legal thinkers. Thomas Jefferson and George Washington bought copies 
within a few years, and John Adams quoted Beccaria in his 1770 defense of the Boston Massacre 
soldiers. The first American edition was published in 1777, and newspapers across the colonies 
serialized the essay in the late 1770s and 1780s.22 William Blackstone, writer of Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, the single most influential work of Anglo-American law and a 
“runaway bestseller” in the colonies,23 praised Beccaria as “an ingenious writer,” summarizing 
his argument against the death penalty in his fourth volume.24 “From the late 1760s until nearly a 
century later, Beccaria was a name familiar to literate Americans,” and newspapers, debate 
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societies, activists, and political thinkers frequently followed or expanded upon his line of 
thinking.25 
 The problem of capital punishment opposition in the 1760s and 70s became a pandemic 
during the drafting and ratification period, transitioning from a focus on abolition for property 
crimes to support for total abolition. Juries from North Carolina to Pennsylvania frequently 
returned mercy acquittals, the earliest explicit record of which is from 1726.26 Mercy acquittals 
for property crimes became so frequent that the Georgia Gazette in 1767 proposed a total 
overhaul of the penal system; the New Jersey Legislature explicitly cited the Colony’s inability 
to obtain capital convictions in its decision to substitute corporal for capital punishment for 
property crimes in 1769.27 In 1778, Thomas Jefferson drafted a bill for the Virginia Legislature 
which proposed doing away with capital punishment altogether, claiming that capital statutes 
“exterminate instead of reforming.”28 The Virginia General Court expressed approval for the 
law, writing to the Governor “we cannot but lament that the laws relating to capital punishments, 
are in many cases too severe.” When the Bill was finally put before the House of Delegates in 
1785, it lost by only one vote.29 Five states abolished capital punishment for crimes other than 
murder from 1794 to 1798, three of which abolished it for some kinds of murder.30 
 Debates over total abolition of the death penalty were common in late 1780s Philadelphia 
and spread quickly to other cities in the 1790s, especially New York.31  Citing numerous 
abolitionist writings of the 1780s and 90s, Stuart Banner proposes that because thinkers of the 
founding period saw themselves as living in an era of great progress, capital punishment was 
seen as lagging behind, a relic of a “ruder, more barbaric time.”  Arguing against the authority of 
the Bible, Pennsylvania Attorney General William Bradford argued that “[l]aws might have been 
proper for a tribe of ardent barbarians wandering through the sands of Arabia which are wholly 
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unfit for an enlightened people of civilized and gentle manners.” The editor of the American 
Minerva argued that the death penalty can only be justified on the grounds that a criminal’s 
execution “is necessary to the future safety of society,” and if “confinement will effectually 
answer this end, the question is decided against all capital punishment.” The Yale Senior class 
took up the question for debate in 1784, asking whether the death penalty was “too severe & 
rigorous […] for the present stage of society.”32 The idea of progress is certainly apparent in 
Banner’s citations, and his thesis finds support in the contemporaneous development of the 
American penitentiary and penal system.  
Abolitionists saw no justification for the death penalty that was not served by the 
developing prison system, and ultimately favored its lack of arbitrariness and seemingly more 
effectual deterrent factor.33 Although no state abolished capital punishment completely during 
the founding and ratification period, or for many years after, it was severely limited and in many 
places barely used. Many states used the benefit of the clergy, an arcane English exemption for 
members of the priesthood, to give criminals convicted of capital crimes a mulligan.34 They were 
marked by a burn on the thumb to notify members of the public and prosecutors in other districts 
of their criminal record.35 Simulated hangings, in which the ‘condemned’ was sentenced to stand 
on the gallows with a rope around their neck, were often used in sympathetic cases. Gallows 
reprieves were also common, whereby officials would wait until the last moment to inform the 
condemned of executive or legislative clemency, maximizing the reforming effect of existential 
fear without taking the would-be victim’s life.36 In the 1770s and 80s, several state constitutions 
instructed state legislatures to sharply reduce the number of capital crimes.37 In response, states 
developed nuanced legal concepts like dividing murder into degrees, excluded property and non-
lethal crimes (other than treason) from capital statutes, and built prisons to house convicts who 
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would have been executed in the past. The development of the penitentiary system was, in fact, a 
direct response to death penalty abolitionism in the 1780s and 90s.  
What is most important about this brief history is its divergence from the common 
narrative. It is true that capital punishment went virtually unquestioned in the early Colonial 
period, yet the period of the writing and ratification of the Constitution from 1787-89, followed 
by the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, coincides exactly with the apex of early death 
penalty abolitionism in the United States. James Madison, the writer of the Bill of Rights and 
most of the Constitution, was not a fringe thinker, nor were Benjamin Franklin, George 
Washington, or Thomas Jefferson. Abstract political theory like Beccaria was common by the 
end of the eighteenth century, and American colonists were extremely literate in theories of 
rights and governance.38 The question of the death penalty was hotly contested, and opinions 
about its legitimacy, morally and theoretically, were seriously in flux. Any suggestion that the 
founding period lacked serious debate regarding or interest in capital punishment is wrong. A 
stunning number of scholars have made this mistake, Supreme Court justices among them.39 
Banner, the authoritative historian on the death penalty in America, seems miraculously to have 
uncovered what was at the very least a widespread unease surrounding capital punishment during 
the founding period.  
Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Imposed 
 There is little question as to the origin of the Eighth Amendment. The text is lifted 
directly from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, with the minor change that excessive bail 
“shall,” rather than “ought,” not be required. The provision likely had its inspiration in the once-
infamous case of Titus Oates and the Bloody Assizes.40 Oates, ignominiously called Titus the 
Liar, was convicted of perjury after delivering false testimony leading to the execution of 
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multiple people, and was sentenced to be “whipped through the streets of London five days a 
year for the remainder of his life.”41 The Assizes were a series of treason-related trials in August 
of 1685, during which the Lord Chief Justice George Jeffries sentenced almost 1,400 people to 
death in less than a month, a large portion of which were hanged or hanged, drawn, and 
quartered. 
 It is also important to understand the common-law tradition on capital punishment, at 
least in brief. English common law, at least historically, had little qualms with execution for 
certain crimes. Death penalty supporters point frequently to this fact, especially when it comes to 
dignity-based arguments for the Eighth Amendment or abolition. Raoul Berger goes as far as to 
claim that “English and early American law cared not a whit for ‘human dignity,’” citing 
Blackstone, the “oracle of the common law,” to make his point.42  This paper’s reading of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, especially his fourth volume, Of Public Wrongs, disagrees sharply 
with this conclusion. It is true that Blackstone seems to endorse manners of punishment which 
would certainly seem cruel today, but it is also the case that Blackstone treats execution with the 
utmost care, and subjects it to rigorous, even critical analysis.  
 First, Blackstone identifies the deterrence rationale as the only legitimate justification for 
administering death. Only when “offenses grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a 
kingdom or state […], and to the great insecurity and danger of the kingdom or its inhabitants, 
[are] severe punishments and even death itself […] necessary.”43 Even then, “every humane 
legislator will be […] extremely cautious of establishing laws that inflict the penalty of death 
[…]. He will expect a better reason for his so doing, than that loose one which is generally given; 
that it is found by former experience that no lighter penalty will be effectual. For is it found upon 
farther experience, that capital punishments are more effectual?”44 This is because “to shed the 
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blood of our fellow creature is a matter that requires the greatest deliberation, and the fullest 
conviction of our own authority: for life is the immediate gift of God to man; which neither can 
he resign, nor can it be taken from him, unless by the command or permission of him who gave 
it; either expressly revealed, or collected from the laws of nature or society by clear and 
indisputable demonstration.”45 In his tenth chapter, Blackstone even suggests that “corporal and 
pecuniary,” rather than capital, punishments are more suited to English law.46 Blackstone, 
contrary to Berger’s reading, seems to care quite a bit for human dignity, insofar as it is inherent 
to human life. The “oracle of common law,” under a conservative reading, seems incredibly 
uneasy about the use of the death penalty, suggesting that even the deterrence rationale has little 
proof of being “effectual.”   
 When it comes to ratification of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
some twenty years after Blackstone, there is little discussion of the provision at all. The entire 
record of the debate from the First Congress is as follows: 
“Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to 
the words ‘nor cruel and unusual 
punishments;’ the import of them being too 
indefinite. 
 
Mr. Livermore.— The [Eighth Amendment] 
seems to express a great deal of humanity, 
on which account I have no objection to it; 
but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do 
not think it necessary. What is meant by the 
term excessive bail? Who are to be the 
judges? What is understood by excessive 
fines? It lies with the court to determine. No 
cruel and unusual punishment is to be 
inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a 
man, villains often deserve whipping, and 
perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we 
in the future to be prevented from inflicting 
these punishments because they are cruel? If 
a more lenient mode of correcting vice and 
deterring others from the commission of it 
could be invented, it would be very prudent 
in the legislature to adopt it; but until we 
have some security that this will be done, we 
ought not to be restrained from making 
necessary laws by any declaration of this 
kind. 
 
The question was put on the [Eighth 
Amendment], and it was agreed to by a 
considerable majority.”47 
 
There is little to be made of this, at least at face value. Justice Brennan, in Furman, suggests that 
in the face of Livermore’s concerns that the Eighth Amendment might someday be used to limit 
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such “necessary” punishments as whipping, ear cropping, and death, the “‘considerable majority’ 
was prepared to run that risk.” And “[n]o member of the House rose to reply that the Clause was 
intended merely to prohibit torture.”48 
 Patrick Henry’s speech to the Virginia House of Delegates during the 1788 ratification 
debates for the US Constitution provides a clearer, though less authoritative, exposition of the 
intention behind the Cruel and Unusual Clause49 Complaining about the possibility of ratifying 
the new constitution without a bill of rights, Henry warned his fellow delegates as follows: 
“What says our Bill of Rights?50 ‘That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ Are you not therefore now calling 
on those Gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials and define punishments 
without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this Bill of Rights? You let them 
loose—you do more—you depart from the genius of your country.”51 Patrick Henry fought 
bitterly against Federalists like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison who did not want a bill 
of rights to be part of the Constitution. Madison believed that the greatest danger to individual 
liberty lay in the people themselves, not their elected representatives, and doubted that any 
formal enumeration of rights could restrict the plasticity of a legislature.52 At the time of the 
ratification, his only hope for the Bill of Rights demanded by the Anti-Federalists was that the 
underlying principles of the Rights as listed would enter the popular conscience as educational 
principles. But this was too feeble a restraint on injustice for Patrick Henry and his fellow Anti-
Federalists. As Justice McKenna put it, “their predominant political impulse was distrust of 
power, and they insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse. [They] intended more 
than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts. [So] it must 
have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which 
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inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.”53 While Madison hoped only for a statement of philosophy, 
of aspiration even, Henry wanted an elastic tool for future generations to combat the ability of 
the national legislature to punish. Punishments would evolve, so too must the people’s ability to 
strike them down. Both Mr. Smith and Mr. Livermore objected to the ambiguity of the clause 
Henry wanted, seeing its potential to limit the government from once-‘acceptable’ practices in 
the near future. Many of the Amendment’s ratifiers, it appears, had little qualms with this 
possibility. 
Eighth Amendment Foundations in Weems and Trop 
Not until 1910, nearly 120 years after the Eighth Amendment was ratified, would the 
Supreme Court of the United States get the chance to weigh in on the meaning of the “cruel and 
unusual punishments” clause.54 Paul Weems, a disbursing officer for the United States Coast 
Guard in the Philippines, was charged and convicted of falsifying a public document for the 
purposes of defrauding the government after it was discovered he made a mistaken entry in a 
government accounting book. He was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor in irons, ordered to 
pay a 4,000 peso fine, and subject to government surveillance for the rest of his life. In Weems v. 
United States (1910), the Court overturned the conviction as unlawful and determined that the 
sentence constituted a cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.55 
Writing for the Court, Justice McKenna reviewed the history of the Eighth Amendment,  and 
determined based on the arguments of Patrick Henry and his confederates at the Virginia 
Convention that the Eighth Amendment meant more than simply disallowing breaking on the 
wheel or quartering. In words that would emanate throughout Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Court determined Eighth Amendment interpretation  
should not [be] necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.  
 Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  
12
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 Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the 
 mischief which gave it birth. [Constitutions] are not ephemeral enactments, 
 designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice 
 Marshall, ‘designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can 
 approach it.’56  
The Court worried that this had been forgotten, if it had ever been realized at all, and cautioned 
explicitly against ignoring the Eighth Amendment’s intended role as a limitation on legislative 
enactments. Lower court Eighth Amendment cases had only gone as far as to invalidate 
individual discretionary sentences.57 In other words, structural challenges, challenges to classes 
of punishments themselves, were just as good as challenging an individual sentence 
discretionarily imposed. 
The next development in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence would wait until 1958. In 
1944, Albert Trop deserted from a US Army stockade in Morocco with a friend. He ran out of 
food and water in less than a day, and was walking on the main road back to the base when he 
was approached by a US Army officer. He voluntarily surrendered himself, was court martialed, 
convicted and sentenced to three years hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and dishonorable discharge. 
When Trop applied for a passport in 1952 he was denied; the Nationality Act of 1940 contained 
provisions which automatically denationalized deserters of the US Armed Forces, rendering Trop 
stateless upon his conviction in 1944. In Trop v. Dulles (1958), the Court invalidated the 
applicable sections of the Nationality Act of 1940, holding that denationalization violates the 
constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments.58 
Somewhat surprisingly, without the issue being raised by the facts of the case, Chief 
Justice Warren began his opinion for the Court by dispensing with the death penalty as an object 
of concern: as a matter of tradition, it was firmly entrenched, and could not be classified as 
unacceptable to society at large.59 Death penalty supporters often point to this passage, 
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suggesting that concerns about human dignity are explicitly excluded from the Chief Justice’s 
“endorsement” of capital punishment. The rest of the opinion suggests otherwise. 
Building on its interpretation in Weems, the Court wrote that “the words of the 
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.”60 Yet,  
“[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than  
 the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment  
 stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized  
 standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending  
 upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these 
 traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.”61  
Denationalization, the Court held, is decidedly outside such bounds, even though it involves “no 
physical mistreatment, no primitive torture.” Rather, the punishment falls to the Eighth 
Amendment because it involves “the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized 
society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual 
the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of 
his status in the national and international political community. […] [T]he expatriate has lost his 
right to have rights.”62 On the precedent of Weems and its own disgust with denationalization as 
a penal measure, the Court fashioned a new rule of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: “The 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”63 
Important to note from Trop64 is the irreconcilable disagreement between parts of the 
opinion only paragraphs apart. The language the Court used to declare denationalization 
unconstitutional might easily be applied to capital punishment. Does execution not constitute 
“the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society”? Is it not his loss of the 
“right to have rights”? But we can also see between the two cases the development of two parts 
of Eighth Amendment doctrine. The Eighth Amendment is at once based on respect for “the 
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dignity of man,” yet also draws its meaning from “the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.” As this paper already noted, the Court took the positions of 
both Patrick Henry and James Madison at the same time. The Court has never conclusively 
squared the difference between these two doctrines, nor suggested that one takes precedence over 
the other.   
Death on the Docket 
 On the backdrop of Weems and Trop, a conflicting and difficult set of precedents to work 
with, the Court heard and decided the case of Furman v. Georgia (1972), ruling for the first time 
on a direct challenge to the death penalty as a “cruel and unusual punishment.”65 The case is a 
mess, the longest in Supreme Court history: each of the five Justices in the majority filed 
separate concurring opinions, as did each of the dissenting Justices. The official holding is that 
the “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty [in the cases before the Court] 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” 
yet none of the majority agreed in full on why.66 Justice Douglas worried that the death sentences 
in the cases before the Court were imposed “arbitrarily and discriminatorily,” Justice Brennan 
believed the death penalty itself to be an unconstitutional violation of the dignity of man, Justice 
Stewart found no discrimination, but found that the Constitution could not tolerate the execution 
of “a capriciously selected random handful” under statues that seem to ‘strike like lighting,’ 
Justice White took issue with overly discretionary jury-sentencing procedures, and Justice 
Marshall thought the death penalty was discriminatorily imposed, excessive, “unacceptable to 
the people of the United States,” and more.67 What was clear, however, was that capital 
punishment across the country needed reevaluation. Scholars and thirty-five state legislatures 
soon took up the challenge, building a new capital regime for constitutional approval.  
15
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 Most of the Court’s problems with Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme stemmed from 
two related factors: broad eligibility and extreme discretion. State statutes like Georgia’s 
permitted the death penalty for rapists, armed robbers, and kidnappers, as well as murderers. Yet 
the Georgia statute provided no guidance for juries on how to sentence those they convicted of 
these various crimes. A rapist might be executed, be imprisoned for life, or imprisoned for one to 
twenty years, and juries received no instructions on which types of offenders ought to be 
sentenced to which.68 The combination of these two factors led to extremely rare and 
uncorrelated sentences, which suggests either that the penalty itself was unpopular, or that some 
highly “deserving” offenders were executed while similar others are spared for arbitrary 
reasons.69 Only a minor difficulty seemed the fact that the “deserving” offenders tended to be 
black and their victims white.70 The Furman majority was especially concerned by the second 
possibility: that the “right” offenders were not being selected for execution. 
Capital trials before Furman were customarily unitary, undistinguished proceedings. The 
lawyers were the same as non-capital lawyers, jury selection was largely based on avoiding 
people opposed to capital punishment, jurors were not specially instructed, and the verdict and 
sentence were almost always decided in a one-stage trial, only using evidence related to the 
crime.71 This left prosecutors unable to seek capital sentences on crimes linked by similar 
(legally relevant) factors, and untrained defense attorneys unable to offer mitigating evidence 
from their client’s background during sentencing if irrelevant to the crime. The seeming 
nonchalance of such procedures left the Court worried that it could not say decisively that the 
death penalty was not an arbitrary exercise, or that States fully appreciated the urgency of just 
proceedings where the result would be death.  
16
International Social Science Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/iss4/3
  
Out of the Furman opinions, scholars have identified four major “doctrines” that would 
define the Court’s attempts at regulating capital practices. Carol and Jordan Steiker state them 
concisely:  
The first, “narrowing,” requires states to limit the types of murders punishable by death 
through the enumeration of aggravating factors. The second, “proportionality,” places 
constitutional limits on offenses and offenders subject to the death penalty. The third, 
“individualized sentencing,” insists that state statutes permit jurors to reject the death 
penalty based on mitigating aspects of the offense or the offender. The fourth, 
“heightened reliability,” demands that capital proceedings provide additional safeguards 
given the categorial difference between death and all other punishments.72 
 
Post-Furman, State legislatures rushed to write capital statutes which complied with each of 
these doctrines, and thus began the era of constitutional regulation of capital punishment. 
Part II: The Worm at the Core 
Having established the historical background of capital punishment in the United States, 
the origins and development of Eighth Amendment doctrine, and the foundations of 
constitutional regulation of capital punishment, this section will delve into the successes and 
failures of the modern death penalty era. It will evaluate the development of case law following 
Furman and raise concerns about both the Furman standards and other precepts of capital 
punishment jurisprudence developed in the decades following. It will then conclude with an 
extensive analysis of the heart of the question: whether the death penalty ought to be considered 
constitutional. Using a historically-informed combination of the two threads of Eighth 
Amendment doctrine developed by the Court, It will combine a discussion of human dignity with 
the extensive empirical study below to suggest a unified method by which the death penalty can 
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The Modern Death Penalty Era 
In 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari73 on five cases challenging the 
constitutionality of state death penalty laws reformed in the wake of Furman: Gregg v. Georgia, 
Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Roberts v. Louisiana.74 In 
this set of cases, often referred to by the lead case, Gregg, the Court distinguished between two 
basic approaches by state legislatures to meeting the Furman standards for capital punishment.   
Louisiana and North Carolina had responded to Furman by limiting jury discretion in the 
extreme, making the death penalty mandatory for a limited range of crimes defined by specific 
factors. The Court rejected this approach, holding that mandatory death statutes were 
unconstitutional in themselves because they did not comport with the “evolving standards of 
decency” principle established in Trop, or individualize sentencing with respect for human 
dignity.75 The Court also pointed to the historic phenomena of mercy acquittals, believing that 
juries would still exercise discretion when considering the grave consequences of a first degree 
murder or rape conviction, yet remain without guidance as to which murderers should receive the 
death penalty.76 
Georgia, Texas, and Florida responded quite differently, placing great emphasis on both 
jury discretion and targeted statutes. The Court upheld their death penalty schemes, its most 
extensive analysis being in Gregg v. Georgia. The new Georgia capital statute used five principal 
methods of offering allegedly extensive opportunities for jury discretion and appeal, while also 
limiting death sentencing to a verifiably ‘worse’ category of offenders: 1) capital sentences were 
limited to a smaller category of crimes; 2) the trial judge was required to charge offenses below 
capital crimes “when they are supported by any view of the evidence”; 3) if a defendant was 
convicted, the defendant would have substantial latitude to present mitigating evidence to avoid 
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death in a separate sentencing stage; 4) the jury would only be allowed, though not required, to 
convict if it found the presence of enumerated aggravating factors in the evidence presented by 
the prosecutor during the trial phase only; 5) the defendant would have a mandatory appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Georgia upon receiving a sentence of death, and it would be required to 
consider a claim of discriminatory application.77 The Court approved of the bifurcated 
proceedings and aggravating/mitigating factors scheme, finding that “[w]hile such standards are 
by necessity general, they do provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce the 
likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary.”78 The 
Court praised the mandatory appeal provision for similar reasons, claiming it would effectively 
screen for arbitrary factors like the influence of race.79  
Most notably, the Court in Gregg dedicated the entire first section of its opinion to 
explaining that in light of Furman’s indecisiveness on the matter, it believed “that the 
punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”80 It began by recognizing, in 
the wake of precedent, that the Eighth Amendment is not a static concept, nor can it be limited to 
modes of torture or seventeenth-century methods of punishment; the Court also reaffirmed that a 
penalty must “accord with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is the ‘basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment.’”81 The Court, however, limited the scope of such an inquiry to the idea that 
a punishment may not be excessive, 82 a principle which it then limited again by establishing a 
constitutional presumption for the validity of a penal measure selected by “a democratically 
elected legislature.”83 Seemingly breaking with Weems’ insistence that courts view the Eighth 
Amendment as a limit on legislatures,84 the Court held “[w]e may not require the legislature to 
select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or 
disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the 
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judgement of the representatives of the people.”85 Finally, the Court concluded that the death 
penalty survived constitutional challenge, and therefore comports with the “dignity of man,” for 
two reasons. The first was that “a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as 
an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction,” as demonstrated by the thirty-five state 
legislatures which enacted new death statutes in response to Furman and the fact that juries 
continued to sentence convicts to death under these statutes.86 The second was that the death 
penalty serves two legitimate social purposes: retribution, which is valid because it allegedly 
prevents vigilantism, and deterrence, which, though “there is no convincing empirical evidence 
either supporting or refuting” its true influence, is valid because it makes intuitive sense.87 The 
Court upheld the Florida and Texas statutes on similar grounds.  
Unfinished Business 
Following Gregg, the Court’s woes were not over. It was forced, again and again, to 
make the kinds of judgements it had tried to defer to legislatures in Gregg, enforcing its own 
Furman standards in the decades that followed. In Coker v. Georgia (1977), the Court addressed 
the proportionality standard by invalidating the death penalty for rape.88 In McCleskey v. Kemp 
(1987)—a decision that has been called the modern-day Dredd Scott89—the Court accepted a 
sophisticated study90 that found that defendants killing white victims were more than four times 
as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants who killed Black victims, yet refused to say that 
this proved discrimination in the individual case of the black man with a white victim before it.91 
The Court also worried that “McCleskey’s case, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into 
serious question the principles that underly our entire criminal justice system.”92 In Thompson v. 
Oklahoma (1988), the Court invalidated the death penalty as applied to an offender who was 
fifteen at the time of the crime, reestablishing explicitly the judiciary’s role in continuously 
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interpreting the Eighth Amendment according to evolving standards of decency.93 In Stanford v. 
Kentucky (1989), the Court approved execution for offenders who were at least sixteen; in Penry 
v. Lynaugh (1989), the Court also approved the execution of the mentally disabled.94 In Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002), the Court reversed Penry just thirteen years later, holding that execution of the 
mentally disabled no longer comports with evolving standards of decency.95 Three years after, 
the Court reversed Stanford in Roper v. Simmons (2005), holding that execution of offending 
minors no longer comports with evolving standards of decency either.96  
There are most certainly other cases97 in which the Court has considered the death 
penalty, but the above major cases  addresses directly at least one of the Furman criteria. 
Notably, the Court has stayed away from evaluating the success of the “heightened reliability,” 
“narrowing,” or “individualized sentencing” standards (with the exception of invalidating 
mandatory statutes in the Gregg cases). After a badly botched decision in McCleskey, the Court 
has also resisted hearing challenges based on race, sticking instead to proportionality review in 
safe areas like the execution of minors, the mentally disabled, or crimes not resulting in death.98 
Fortunately, legal scholars and statisticians have collected mountains of evidence on the 
successes and failures of the four Furman standards, and their conclusion is nearly universal. The 
following pages will detail some of this work and the extent to which each of the Furman 
standards have succeeded or failed. It is only with this information that the structural success of 
the death penalty can be evaluated, an exercise necessary for the conclusion of this article.  
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Narrowing 
When the Court ruled against mandatory death schemes in Woodson and Roberts, it made 
doctrine of the notion that states had to define specifically an aggravated murder in order to limit 
the number of crimes eligible for a death sentence. This would allow jurors to exercise “guided 
discretion.” The Georgia statute upheld in Gregg used such aggravating factors for this exact 
purpose. Georgia’s aggravators in Gregg were drafted 
in the image of the list from the 1962 Model Penal 
Code,99 a source which almost every capital State 
continues to use today.100  
A quick look at the list reveals an obvious 
problem: nearly every type of premeditated murder 
one can realistically imagine fits one of these 
aggravating factors, and Gregg requires only that the 
jury find one of these eight in the crime to sentence 
the defendant to death.101 The eighth aggravator might 
seem especially egregious, and though the Court once 
held that a death sentence could not be sustained on 
the aggravating factor that a murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile,”102 it later upheld 
Idaho’s patently absurd aggravating factor: “By the murder or circumstances surrounding its 
commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life.”103 In the wake of the Gregg 
decision, states have also continued to add to their list of aggravating factors, a phenomenon 
named “aggravator creep” by death penalty scholars. At the behest of political pressure, states 
have modified their statutes to such an extent that most, if not nearly all, homicides in their 
# Aggravating Factor 
As listed in the 1962 Model Penal code 
1 The murder was committed by a convict 
under sentence of imprisonment. 
2 The defendant was previously convicted of 
another murder or of a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence to the person. 
3 At the time the murder was committed the 
defendant also committed another murder. 
4 The defendant knowingly created a great 
risk of death to many persons. 
5 The murder was committed while the 
defendant was engaged or was an 
accomplice in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit 
robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse 
by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, 
or kidnapping. 
6 The murder was committed for the purpose 
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from lawful custody. 
7 The murder was committed for pecuniary 
gain. 
8 The murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity. 
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jurisdictions are death-eligible.104 A 1997 study found that 87 percent of all first degree murders 
in California from 1988-1992 were death-eligible.105 In Georgia, scholars found that 83 percent 
of all murder and nonnegligent manslaughter causes were death-eligible.106 A similar situation 
was found in Missouri, where 76 percent of all homicides were factually death-eligible.107 In 
Colorado, a 2013 study found that a whopping 92 percent of all murder and nonnegligent 
manslaughter cases were death-eligible.108 Deadly Justice: A Statistical Portrait of the Death 
Penalty, an analysis of hundreds of death penalty-related studies, suggests two problems with the 
Court’s goal of narrow targeting. First, the most heinous crimes, or “the worst of the worst,” are 
very difficult to define, and if we acknowledge that race, class, and social differences may render 
jurors more or less outraged at a crime, we cannot expect consistency in their verdicts. Second, 
the perpetrators of the “worst” crimes are not always the most “deserving” of execution: many of 
those who commit extremely heinous crimes have strong mitigating factors attached to them, like 
mental illness or emotional distress.109 
 In any case, it is clear that the Court’s requirement that states narrow the category of 
offenders eligible for death has not been met. States have failed categorically to identify a limited 
number of characteristics which define a heinous murder. Rather, they have “simply described 
the various factors that collectively account for the circumstances surrounding most murders.”110 
Individualized Sentencing 
 The individualized sentencing standard demanded that states allow juries to consider 
mitigating factors when sentencing a person convicted of a capital crime, yet litigation over 
mitigating factors has destroyed their effectiveness. The Court has never defined what kinds of 
evidence judges and juries must be allowed to consider, only that it can be unrelated to the 
crime.111 Most trial courts have therefore adopted the principle suggested in Lockett v. Ohio 
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(1978): that potential mitigating factors ought to be unlimited, and judges should not try to 
instruct juries on how to weigh different mitigating factors against the facts of the crime.112 
Juries have essentially been returned to the pre-Furman era, in which they could exercise mercy 
for essentially any reason, a strong tradition in Anglo-American law. For these reasons, it is 
extremely difficult to define which mitigating factors (among potentially thousands) matter, and 
how much influence they have from a statistical standpoint, so only a few empirical studies have 
taken up the extremely time-consuming task. Even so, “[i]n virtually every large empirical study 
of who gets death, the accumulation of aggravating factors is strongly correlated with death, but 
mitigating factors tend to have less impact.”113 In other words, the standard of individualized 
sentencing has fallen by the wayside, with no meaningful way to define its scope.114  
Proportionality 
 As noted above,115 most of the Court’s development of death penalty case law has been in 
the area of proportionality, but the effect has also been minimal. The Court has proscribed the 
execution of offending minors and the intellectually disabled to date, but these are often the most 
mitigated cases anyway.116 Proportionality, however, takes forms other than limiting which types 
of offenders can be executed.  In a nod to proportionality, the Court in Gregg praised the Georgia 
mandatory appeals scheme for its requirement that a death sentence be set aside if death had not 
been imposed for crimes of a similar character.117 In other words, proportionality demands 
consistent sentencing for the most heinous, death-eligible crimes. In an ideal world, the 
narrowing standard would force states to determine a small group of especially heinous crimes, 
and the proportionality standard would lead jurors to sentence most of these offenders to death. 
This type of proportionality has been studied extensively, and the social science community 
considers the uniformity of the results to be definitive. The general consensus is that “[w]hile 
heinousness and torture tend to make a death sentence more likely, the tendency is very weak. 
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That is, many heinous crimes do not lead to death, and many crimes leading to death were not 
among the state’s most heinous.”118 The four studies cited above make the point: In California, 
only 9.6 percent of death-eligible offenders received a death sentence; in Georgia, only 17 
percent. In Colorado, prosecutors sought the death penalty in only 3 percent of death-eligible 
cases, sought it until the end of the trial in only 1 percent of cases, and won a death sentence in 
only 0.6 percent. In Missouri the trend continues, where only 2.5 percent of death-eligible 
homicides received death sentences. An additional study conducted in New Jersey found that 6 
percent of death-eligible offenders received the death penalty.119 As only a small percentage of 
death-eligible convicts are sentenced to death, it is impossible to say that similar offenders 
receive the same sentences. 
  An additional proportionality concern lies in the fact that some states sentence extremely 
high numbers of offenders but execute very few. California, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee house 
more than three times as many death row inmates as the three leading executioners, Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Virginia.120 Pennsylvania has executed only 3 prisoners out of 408 death 
sentences reached in the last 40 years.121 California has executed only 13 prisoners since Furman 
out of over 77,000 death-eligible homicides; in fact, execution is only the third leading cause of 
death on California’s death row, falling behind suicide and natural causes.122 The national rate of 
execution of those sentenced to death is only 16 or 25 percent, depending on whether we 
consider all death sentences or only those which have exhausted all appeals respectively. The 
conclusion: “[t]he death penalty is used so rarely in the United States that it cannot be seen as a 
usual punishment for capital-eligible crimes.”123 Proportionality, in both sentencing and actual 
administration of the death penalty, has therefore failed. 
25
Cosentino: The Mere Extinguishment of [Human] Life
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
  
Heightened Reliability 
 “Heightened reliability” is the most amorphous of the Furman standards; this paper 
defines it as “fundamental fairness.” Reliability concerns as recognized by the Court have taken 
the shape of quality control for legal representation, the availability of habeas corpus petitions to 
federal courts, and even how courts are required to treat evidence of actual innocence, and while 
important, are outside the stated scope of this paper124 Instead, it is most important to highlight 
the stunning degree to which race continues to play a definitive role in American capital 
punishment, despite the “reliability” standard’s intention otherwise.  
 As has been the case throughout American history, “[w]hen we get to the death penalty, 
the data suggest that the odds of execution strongly depend on the race and gender of the 
victim.”125 This tendency has been studied dozens of times with exhaustive data sets and 
extremely sophisticated analysis. In 1990, the US Governmental Accountability Office selected 
28 such high quality death penalty studies for analysis, and concluded that 82 percent of them 
proved that “those who murdered whites were more likely to be sentenced to death than those 
who murdered blacks, controlling for legally relevant factors.”126 Studies demonstrate that Black 
defendants are three times more likely than whites to receive the death penalty when the victim 
is white, and that all defendants accused of killing white victims were more than four times more 
likely to receive a death sentence than those accused of killing Black victims.127 When gender 
and race are included together, 1.24 percent of homicides with a white female victim result on a 
death sentence, while only 0.1 percent of homicides with a black male victim result in a death 
sentence. “[W]hen a white person kills a black victim, especially a male victim, odds of an 
execution are vanishingly small. In fact, in many US states, such an execution has never 
occurred…”128 The tradition inherited from early colonial death statutes, which wantonly 
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executed Blacks for the most meager crimes, is exactly the kind of “caste aspect” that led Justice 
Douglas to find the death penalty unconstitutional as administered in Furman, and it lives on in 
today’s system.129 Heightened reliability has failed.  
Objective Indicia 
In concluding this analysis of constitutional regulation, the serious flaws in the method by 
which the Court determines “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society” should be noted.130 These are what the Court calls “objective indicia” of the 
public perception of capital punishment: jury sentencing practices and state legislative 
practices.131 
Jury sentencing practices are certainly somewhat representative of the social acceptance 
of capital punishment: if nobody is sentenced to death, then society certainly does not approve. 
Notwithstanding the extremely low sentencing and execution rates, the Court seems to have 
forgotten that opponents of capital punishment are not permitted to serve on capital juries.132 In 
most cases, the prosecutor need not even use a preemptory strike to seek their dismissal. There is 
no similar exclusion for the stalwart supporter of capital punishment, which obviously makes the 
jury an unrepresentative sample of public opinion. There is also evidence that prosecutors 
“frequently rely on racial stereotypes and racially coded presumptions of guilt to achieve 
convictions and increase the likelihood that the death penalty will be imposed,” thereby adding 
more arbitrariness to any reliance on jury sentencing practices.133 When considering jury 
sentencing practices, it must be  remembered that they exclude a large portion of society, a group 
whose opinions are very relevant to determining “evolving standards of decency.”  
In relation to state legislative decisions, two points should be noted. First, it has proven to 
be an unreliable indicator of social consensus. After the Court approved the execution of 
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mentally disabled offenders in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989), nineteen states exempted the mentally 
disabled from execution which had not done so already. The Court was forced to overturn Penry 
just thirteen years later. The same is true of executing juvenile offenders: the Court reversed 
itself in Stanford just fifteen years later. These cases used state legislatures as “objective indicia,” 
and both were rejected by many of those same legislatures only a few years later.134 Second, 
using the actions of popularly-elected legislatures to decide the constitutionality of their own 
policies toward extreme minorities is simply nonsensical. United States v. Caroline Products 
(1938) has recognized that legislative enactments deserve stricter scrutiny when they affect 
“discrete and insular minorities,” especially those who lack sufficient social or political power to 
protect their own rights.135 Death row inmates are as discrete, insular, politically and socially 
powerless as it gets. Death penalty statutes are also subject to social order rhetoric which often 
extends the political will for the death penalty beyond its actual popular support.136 These 
objections call into question the Court’s deference to state legislative judgement in Gregg and 
onward,137 not only in their application of the death penalty, but their role in determining 
“evolving standards of decency.”  
Part III: The Heart of the Question 
Human Dignity: The First Thread 
In light of the repeated and spectacular failures of constitutional regulation, can one still 
say the death penalty is constitutional as applied? Clearly not, at least based on the Court’s own 
rules. The failures of the system are not simply in the state legislatures, but in the fundamental 
conflicts of the Furman standards themselves. “Experience has taught us that the constitutional 
goal of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death […] can 
never be achieved without compromising an equally essential component of fundamental 
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fairness—individualized sentencing.”138 This impossibility alone has led at least one Supreme 
Court justice who believed in the constitutionality of the death penalty per se to renounce his 
support.139 Yet the Court has continued to regulate, not finding Eighth Amendment justification 
for invalidating the death penalty on structural grounds. Such justification clearly exists, but  the 
question must go further (or perhaps much less far) than that: there is no constitutional 
compatibility between respect for human dignity and capital punishment in any circumstance. 
Following the foundational Eighth Amendment cases of Weems and Trop, Eighth Amendment 
doctrines declares that penal measures must comport with respect for human dignity.140 It is in 
this first vein that we undertake the following analysis. 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, not excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” 
 
 Looking back to the text of the Eighth Amendment, one might fairly ask where 
constitutional recognition of human dignity could arise. Hugo Adam Bedau explains the problem 
by suggesting three basic approaches to constitutional interpretation: 1) if a term or value is not 
explicit, there is no constitutional recognition; 2) if a term or value is not explicit, there is a 
presumption against its constitutional recognition; 3) if a term or value is not explicit, it can only 
be recognized by the presence of other explicit terms or values which amount to clear 
recognition of the first term or idea itself.141 In terms of the Bill of Rights, the third approach has 
been the most popular with the Court. It is obvious, of course, that principles often defend values 
which they do not explicitly mention,142 and in the case of the Eighth Amendment, “[w]e cannot 
make sense of the prohibition [on “cruel” and “unusual” punishments] without acknowledgement 
of the underling values; we cannot accept the prohibition without tacitly embracing the values it 
protects.”143 Anyone who views the Bill of Rights as strict, unambiguous rules of governance, 
rather than value-stating principles, will find their position woefully unsupported by the 
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historical record.144 James Madison, the very author of the Bill of Rights (and noted death 
penalty opponent), had no confidence in explicit prohibitions, hoping only that the principles of 
the Bill would earn “that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which 
perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite liberty.”145 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Court identified respect for human dignity as the principle 
underlying the Eighth Amendment in its earliest cases, a decision which has been accepted by 
the Court over and over for decades.146 Inspired by Bedau, one could ask, is it truly possible to 
say “I am all for the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, but I 
don’t give a fig about human dignity.”?  
 The Supreme Court has, however, decided that respect for human dignity is somehow 
compatible with execution by the State, largely because of the legitimacy of the deterrent and 
retributive rationales.147 Each State interest has been the subject of vigorous historic objection,148 
and deterrence especially receives no statistical support after decades of intense study,149 but the 
intelligibility of both (insofar as they are state interests to be weighed) relies on either the 
assumption that the condemned forfeits his right to life, or the idea that the State as constituted 
can take his right to life from him in order to further its own interests. This is because it is a basic 
principle of our founding philosophy that simple considerations of social utility are insufficient 
to override the basic rights held by individuals. Blackstone is ambivalent between forfeiture and 
seizure, and offers little critical analysis of how exactly it can be the case that government is 
empowered to determine that a subject no longer has, by hook or by crook, the basic humanity 
required to have his right to life.150 Enlightenment philosophy is somewhat more supportive of 
“forfeiture,” most clearly in the works of Locke and Rousseau.151 Yet the founding generation 
seem to have been unimpressed by this argument, at least when drafting their major documents 
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of political philosophy. The founding period is littered with political speech asserting 
“inalienable rights.” The Declaration of Independence asserts the inalienable right to life, as does 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and every state constitution in existence during the drafting 
and ratification period. A contradiction remains: it is also uncontroversial that the death penalty 
was a common feature of criminal justice during this period.152 A founding-era tension existed 
between the inalienable rights of man and the traditional practice, inherited from England, of 
executing criminals. 
 As already noted, a crucial difference between the criminal justice system from which the 
founding generation inherited the death penalty and the one they established in the United States, 
is that the American federal government is built upon popular sovereignty. The people grant 
certain powers to their government, and reserve all other powers and rights. They also retain 
sovereignty, which is to say that every action of government is underwritten by the authority of 
the people, a fact which, when applied to the American death penalty, is clearly illustrated by the 
entirely local nature of its administration during the founding period.153 For this reason, the 
language of forfeiture is somewhat disingenuous. “[I]t wraps in deceptive legalistic-moralistic 
language the fact that it is we who have decided the murderer shall die, and that we are about to 
kill him.”154 Such a decision relies on popular power to decide that their fellow man no longer 
has the right to life, a right, among his others, derived from his inherent dignity/status as a human 
being. It is unclear where the people derive such power, that is, the power to “decree that 
someone no longer has the status of a moral human being.”155  
The very purpose of retaining natural and inalienable rights from the government is that it 
be denied such powers. In fact, our entire criminal justice system depends on criminals retaining 
their dignity. A criminal’s status as a moral being, their dignity and autonomy,156 is the very 
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reason that they can be held responsible for a crime, a fact demonstrated by the legal 
presumption against penalty for the insane or mentally disabled. So, too, demonstrates the fact 
that murderers retain expansive rights of due process, legal representation, and jury trial before 
and after their conviction, right up until their execution ends their existence. When this logic is 
applied to the death penalty, therefore, the principle and the punishment become incompatible. 
“The judgement that certain persons, who (by virtue of their being persons) are conceded to have 
had basic human rights prior to their criminal acts, nevertheless forfeit or otherwise relinquish all 
these rights by committing certain crimes—as though they had therewith miraculously ceased to 
be moral creatures at all—receives no support from experience at all.” Furthermore, “[i]t is 
conceptually impossible […] for a person in a given act to deserve condemnation by the law for 
the criminality of that act and for the person to have proved by this act that he is no longer a 
person at all—but only a creature who now lacks any moral standing in the community of 
persons.”157 Recall too the Supreme Court’s own decision in Trop v. Dulles stating 
unequivocally that the government has no power to denationalize its citizens, as this would 
amount to “[t]he total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society…[his] right to 
have rights.”158 It follows that if the government is denied the opportunity to decide which 
American citizens still have basic rights, which is to say rights essential to their humanity, that 
the government is equally denied the power to destroy the very source of those rights: the 
prisoner’s moral and physical personhood.  
“Nor Deprived of Life:”159 the Second Thread 
If constitutionally-mandated respect for human dignity is the worm at the core of the 
death penalty, the Fifth Amendment has played a similar role for abolitionism. Steven Levinson 
called it a “devastating problem” for constitutional abolitionism especially.160 Pro-death penalty 
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scholars, as well as superficial logic, point frequently to the “nor deprived of life” clause as 
evidence of the Framers’ original intention that the government be granted license to kill.161 It is 
certainly one potential reason for the traditional persistence of capital punishment in the face of 
critical analysis of like kind to what we have undertaken thus far. Historical analysis of the 
Eighth and Fifth Amendments, however, leaves this time-worn talking point with significantly 
less support, offering in its place a new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that builds upon 
our human dignity analysis.162 It is in reinterpreting the Fifth Amendment that we return to the 
second thread of Eighth Amendment doctrine: that its purview changes with “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”163 
Nobody suggests that the Framers produced a Constitution that was exactly reflective of 
their beliefs or the time in which they lived.164 Compromise in light of political difference was an 
essential part of drafting and ratification, as was the very inclusion of the Bill of Rights, 
demonstrated by the fact that the original Constitution contained clauses sharply in conflict with 
the overall philosophy of the document. Among the many aspects of founding-era society which 
the Constitution aspired beyond, slavery is perhaps the most obvious. The Constitution never 
explicitly mentions “slavery” because of the Founders’ distaste for the institution, but contains 
eleven clauses with implications for slave property and slaveowners’ interests, most notably the 
“three fifths” clause. Yet it would be anathematic to suggest that each and every other provision 
for liberty in the Constitution must therefore be sympathetic of slavery. To do so would be to 
reject the historical record and the analytical reality that “the sometimes inapposite practical 
immediacy of the Constitution can be separated from the enduring aspiration.”165 
The tension between the new Constitution’s soaring aspirations and certain 
contemporaneous institutions was intentional, aimed at phasing out practices incompatible with 
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liberty and progress, at least according to notable figures at the time. Alexander Stephens, the 
Vice President of the Confederacy, was convinced that the Framers made no effort to 
accommodate the document to institutions they despised, and realized that the Constitution 
“could serve as the basis for a declaration that slavery was constitutionally illegitimate in the 
Union at the very moment in which he spoke, even if it had failed to do so in the founding 
generation.”166 Given the history discussed at the beginning of this work—the turmoil 
surrounding the death penalty during the founding and ratification period, the development of 
mainstream opposition167—there is no intellectual dishonesty in considering a similar 
disagreement with the Constitution and the institution of capital punishment. Recall Banner’s 
argument that primary sources from the founding period indicate that leading thinkers considered 
the death penalty ill-suited to the era of progress in which they lived.168  
If one chooses to view the Eighth Amendment as a feature of an aspirational 
Constitution, a historical record that seemed not to need it begins to make more sense. Why 
would the founding generation, “already free of the most horrific English punishments” that 
inspired the provision’s inclusion in the English Bill of Rights, need the same provision in their 
own Constitution?169During the ratification debates in the House of Representatives, Mr. Smith 
wondered at this very problem. The answer is that the Framers were not interested in creating a 
government that would function only for the maintenance of the society in which they lived. The 
Bill of Rights elucidates principles of just and republican government, at least in large part to 
ensure their acceptance in future generations.170 The Framers were explicit in outlawing certain 
types of criminal procedure when they wanted to be—ex post facto laws and bills of attainder did 
not make the cut—so it is hard not to see the Eighth Amendment as deliberately ambiguous, 
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adaptable to new problems or new understandings of old ones.171 The Supreme Court itself 
agrees with this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Weems v. United States: “Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth.”  
 
Trop v. Dulles: “The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow 
shibboleths. They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental 
powers in our nation.”172  
 
Given this interpretation, especially in light of the distaste for capital punishment held by many 
of the leading figures of the founding generation, This paper follows Gilreath in suggesting that 
“[l]ike slavery, capital punishment, by the very inclusion of the Cruel and Unusual Clause, is 
marked for future visitation with a measure of disapprobation that serves as the seed for its 
eventual obliteration.”173 Perhaps Mr. Livermore, who complained about exactly this potential 
during the House ratification debates, was right.174 The Eighth Amendment is capable of wider 
application than the mischief which gave it birth. Perhaps it even demands it; both Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists had aspirations for the Bill of Rights to be a set of transcendent 
principles.175 To Mr. Livermore’s concern that the Eighth Amendment might someday be used to 
question the constitutionality of capital punishment, all we can reply is that not one member of 
the House stood to tell him that he was wrong. And immediately after, the amendment “was 
agreed to by a considerable majority.”176 
The Fifth Amendment, therefore, ought to be seen as more of an insurance policy than 
anything else: a recognition that capital punishment existed at the time and required due process 
just like any other crime. It is hardly an endorsement of the death penalty. It simply 
“acknowledges that capital punishment was a prevailing practice, but this recognition is similar 
to the recognition accorded slavery.”177 When it comes to the constitutional fate of the death 
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penalty, therefore, our records of the founding period demand that the Eighth Amendment, and 
not the Fifth, be where we look.   
A Total View of the Eighth Amendment 
 It is clear that the Eighth Amendment can function as both a restrictive and aspirational 
constitutional mandate. It is restrictive in the sense that it proscribes penal measures which are 
incongruent with the moral status of every American citizen. Punishments like torture, which 
throw into question the dignity of the victim, are proscribed. so if we think with any moral clarity 
about the rights Americans reserved for ourselves from government, indeed the rights that are 
inalienable from us, we find ourselves at a loss for justification to take by force the very quality 
of other citizens that makes them bearers of any rights at all. The Court made a great error when 
it began its decisions on execution by describing it as “the mere extinguishment of life,” for such 
action is not “mere” at all.178 When we execute a prisoner who has done violence to a member of 
our society, we totally destroy his moral and physical existence. It is truly difficult to distinguish 
such action from shooting a prisoner of war.  
 The Eighth Amendment is also aspirational. The Framers gifted Americans principles of 
just and republican government that were better than their time, demanding that we reflect on 
their meaning and apply them to the injustices of our own age. The Eighth Amendment is one 
such principle, one which harkens to a more enlightened future in each generation which reads 
its words. It is a reminder, a call to action, a mandate even, to ensure that institutions, systems, 
which carry out justice in our name, on our authority, respect human dignity. It gives 
ammunition to destroy institutions which sentence to death one race more than the other, give 
different penalties for identical crimes, or fail to respect the humanity of those they act upon. Let 
us not forget that the government acts only on the authority of the people who decide whether 
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state and federal governments execute people. Nor should the Court forget that the Eighth 
Amendment empowers them in a similar way. It is intended to curtail legislative enactments like 
capital statutes, and its aspirational mandate applies no less to the Supreme Court justice than the 
American voter.179   
Conclusion 
This article illustrates the injustice in our capital punishment system that the Eighth 
Amendment demands action upon. In the Court’s experience with the death penalty and its 
attempts to regulate it over more than fifty years, the United States has seen “the inevitability of 
factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some 
defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent and reliable sentences of death 
required by the Constitution.”180 The statistical record of constitutional regulation is 
incompatible with an aspirational interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, and urgently so. Even 
if the Court believes that the death penalty comports with Eighth Amendment respect for human 
dignity, which it obviously does not, the founding generation also gave us and the Court 
constitutional justification to invalidate capital punishment on structural grounds. 
The combination of these two threads of Eighth Amendment doctrine, identified by the 
Court in its first Eighth Amendment cases, is the most comprehensive interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment this paper can suggest, and the one most offended by capital punishment. 
Unfortunately, abolitionists have heretofore been forced to focus on one or the other. Those, like 
Bedau, who focus on the conflict between respect for human dignity and capital punishment, can 
demonstrate a clear philosophical incompatibility with the death penalty as such, but cannot 
argue with a Court that has declared otherwise and will only hear challenges on regulation. On 
the other hand, scholars like Carol and Jordan Steiker and the hundreds of statisticians who have 
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studied the failures of constitutional regulation, argue that the Court might invalidate the death 
penalty on structural grounds, but find themselves at a loss for historical and constitutional 
justification to say that structural failures can justify invalidating the death penalty itself.  
This historical analysis, combined with identification of these threads of Eighth 
Amendment interpretation and the clear failures of constitutional regulation, offers a valid 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that combines both as such and structural claims against 
the constitutionality of capital punishment. Not only does simple logical analysis of human 
dignity and capital punishment invalidate its use in individual cases, but the founding history and 
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